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121 delayed or altogether flounder and the relationship may be prevented from developing.

Gouldner's answer to this dilemma was that there must be a 'norm of reciprocity', internalised in both parties, which *obliges* the one who has first received a benefit to repay it at some time. Other sociologists, such as Blau (1964: 92–3), do not accept this particular explanation, because they do not believe that all social constraints are normative 'and those imposed by the nature of social exchange are not, at least, not originally'. Blau argues, in short, that the advantages to be gained from entering into exchange relations are psychologically so compelling that dangers and suspicions are insufficient obstacles. Even those who fully agree that not all social constraints are normative may feel dissatisfied with this psychological non-explanation.

Let us now consider how the dilemma can be solved in terms of Orokaiva social philosophy as presented in previous sections of this chapter. Orokaiva recognise that social exchange is precarious but claim to have various (magical) devices which are successful if properly used. These devices appear in my model as mediating elements. Why do Orokaiva believe in their effectiveness? They do so because the mediating devices have been instituted by demigods whose heroic feats they re-enact in their rituals. There is a strict code saying what should be done and how it should be done. The exchange fails if the code is not followed. What we have is not, as Gouldner suggests, one norm of reciprocity, but a wide range of codes deriving their authority from mythical demigods. The 'starting mechanism' is, in effect, the whole of Orokaiva mythology. I have been unable to find a charter in this mythology for any rule that a person who has received a benefit should repay it; in other words, I do not know of an Orokaiva mythical charter for a norm of reciprocity. All I have encountered are rules stating what acts are necessary if certain types of exchange are to be effected successfully.

776 I shall clarify these generalisations by giving a brief account of the nature of
171 these demigods and of the rules they instituted, so as to be able to set out more
773 clearly their role in the Orokaiva exchange system. The demigods of the Orokaiva resemble those found throughout Melanesia. Not all the cultures who believe in such demigods have a generic term for them. The Marind-anim of Western New Guinea, however, use the term *dema* to refer to all beings who lived in original time, to whom the creation of a feature of the cultural order is ascribed, and who are celebrated in myth and ritual. I shall follow Jensen (1960) and borrow the Marind-anim term, though other terms used in anthropological literature (culture hero, transformer, etc.) have a somewhat similar meaning.

Jensen presents a useful generalised portrait of these *dema*, as they are found in cultures of tropical tuber cultivators. In general, they are not creators of the natural order but rather of the salient features of material, social and religious culture. Very often it is not through his deeds that a person becomes a *dema* but through the circumstances of his death or departure, which make his *dema*-like nature apparent and give rise to an institution. Thus, Totoima became a *dema* as the result of his body being shared among his people; Jomiko and Sirere became *dema* after departing, in their peculiar way, from the world of man. Similarly the coconut *dema* is a girl who was killed and from whose body a coconut grew. Thus she gave the coconut to mankind and, by this gift, acquired the status of

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776 773 171 son (a man) killed his father with a club, a human weapon. Furthermore, the order of superiority was reversed: it was now no longer man who was killed by a tusked being; man became the killer, pig became the quarry.

From this analysis it would appear superficially that it is not Totoima but his son who ought to have been revered as the *dema*. It is he, after all, who has effected the differentiation between man and pig, who has provided man with pig as his quarry. But this is not how the Orokaiva reason. It is the same with the *dema* Pekuma to whom the technique of meat-roasting is ascribed. Pekuma is not the man who invented, by his own ingenuity, the technique of meat-roasting. He was the victim of another man who played a trick on him, dropped him in a hole, and roasted him. He tasted delicious. The Orokaiva remember Pekuma because he *was* the first roast meat and Totoima because he *was* the first quarry. The gift for which they are celebrated is not their inventive ingenuity but their body, in the form of food. Like the victims of cannibal raids, to whom Jensen devotes a lengthy discussion, the *dema* release their spirit power by the deed of being sacrificed, and this spirit power then becomes available to the killers and to all men.

We have seen, however, that the killing of Totoima was not an isolated event; it was done in response to Totoima's own murderous activities. As Jensen points out, in the life history of the *dema* some fault usually occurs, either committed by the *dema* or someone else, which is represented as the cause of death. We may thus, to some extent, view *dema* myths as a special kind of truncated exchange cycle. Totoima's story, for instance, might be represented in the following diagram in which Man and Totoima are the exchange partners, both of whom offer their body as an object of exchange (or sacrifice):

MODEL 5



In this as in all myths, the exchange cycle is incomplete, as the completing of the cycle in the model would imply that the cycle is intended to repeat itself *ad infinitum*. But the whole point of the myth is that after Totoima it is no longer normal for man to be killed by a pig's tusks, but that pig becomes the normal quarry of man. The world, indeed, has been completely transformed as a result of pig having become man's quarry. Man is now able to multiply rapidly, deriving a great new strength from the pig-meat he is able to acquire. The exchange cycle shown in model 5 has therefore, since that time, been replaced by institutionalised feasting where pig sacrifice appears as an essential mediating element (model 1).[A]

773 574 We may therefore regard truncated exchange cycles such as are shown in models 2 and 5 as the starting mechanism of Orokaiva exchange. To put this more concretely, let us consider the large platform heaped with taro that is

A [See Category 574, p. 58--Analyst]
B [See Category 574, p. 59--Analyst]

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tendency is to use money income to purchase goods needed for daily life but obtainable in the subsistence sector of the economy (Waddell and Krinks 1968: 192). Only a small minority of the goods used by Orokaiva fall into this category, but if the tendency to exclude most store-bought goods from the gift exchange system continues, we may expect that system gradually to decline in importance as the monetary sector of the economy increases.

In the political sphere, the traditional system of control is still generally in operation at the village level. Under this system some men may exert great influence over a community, but they cannot enforce compliance by physical sanctions. While the Orokaiva generally maintain this system, an exception is made for councillors and committee men acting under delegated power from the government. These men may lay complaints with Australian authority and in practice do not always disdain to do so. Among the New Zealand Maori, any leader who so much as threatens to invoke European authority risks being nicknamed 'Mr. Government' and losing all influence. Not so among the Orokaiva; the argument is that it is better for such powers to be used by an Orokaiva official than by the government itself. Nonetheless, use of authority outside the extended family goes against the Orokaiva ethos and undermines the exchange system in a minor way, because an official, by invoking his *authority*, can obtain something from Alter without becoming indebted to Alter. A traditional leader, under the same circumstances, might have incurred a debt or drawn on a kind of credit balance. Here again, the departure from the traditional exchange system does not greatly intrude in everyday affairs, but is symptomatic of the type of changes social development would bring. There has thus been a growing inconsistency between the norms of the traditional exchange system and the facts of labour migration, cash cropping, adherence to the Christian Church, attendance at meetings called by councillors, school education, use of medical services, changes in house architecture, participation in women's clubs, savings and loan societies, rubber co-operatives and the like. How, if at all, did Orokaiva thought cope with these basic inconsistencies?

I have explained how traditional institutions are accounted for. When I inquired why it is that mankind wears clothing, makes fires, contracts marriages, I would be told myths about the *dema* responsible for these institutions. I would also be told that after the *dema* had shown men how to act in these matters there had never been any change. There was primordial time during which men lived, one might say, in the state of nature. In spite of the absence of strife and death that era was not invariably represented as a happy one. Women were desolate because they had no men to marry, no fire to cook with, no houses to live in. In spite of most obstinate and desperate efforts, graphically described in the myths, mankind failed to get the things it needed. The *dema* thus brought release from suffering when they introduced cultural goods, techniques and rules of behaviour. But after the *dema* died, nothing ever changed again.

While such beliefs belie any suggestions that the Orokaiva are without history,[1] it remains true that the Orokaiva repertoire of historical explanations is very small. The actions of the *dema*, the scission of lineages comparable to the branches of a tree, the settlement of villages by men sleeping under a *barevo* tree – this completes the set of traditional historical explanations of which I have knowledge. How could the Orokaiva, confined to this set of concepts, find

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differences that must be clearly stated to avoid confusion. When the two earlier authors speak of mediation, they are usually dealing with real existents which appear as binary oppositions in non-empirical cognitive systems, e.g. earth /sky. The mediating element is likewise a real existent which is physically interposed between the two opposites. e.g. trees, birds. Their physically intermediate position is an empirical fact utilised in the building of cognitive systems, which treat trees or birds as mediators between earth and sky.

When Lévi-Strauss speaks of 'mediation' in the context of sacrifice, he warns that he is not speaking of the same thing: while cognitive systems are 'systems of reference' classifying real existents, sacrifice is a 'system of operations', a technique for obtaining certain results where the opposed elements are: the Self (a real existent, in this argument) and the Other – who is transcendant and may be a god postulated for the sake of obtaining the results. While trees and birds are always physically interposed between earth and sky, a pig is interposed between man and god, or between two exchange partners, purely as an operational strategem. It may be replaced by a different object of mediation (a chicken) or by anything else human ingenuity may invent. Lévi-Strauss describes the difference thus:

> *Les systèmes classificatoires se situent au niveau de la langue: ce sont des codes plus ou moins bien faits, mais toujours en vue d'exprimer des sens, tandis que le système du sacrifice représente un discours particulier, et dénué de bon sens quoiqu'il soit frequemment proféré. (ibid. 302)*

This argument applies to social transactions as much as to sacrifice. Certainly, in social transactions *alter* is a real existent, viz. another human being or group of human beings. Yet this *alter* has one crucial transcendental[1] characteristic, namely that *ego* cannot control his will. In making a gift to *alter* we may feel that by the norm of reciprocity we ought to receive something in return, but we can never be sure that we will. Mediating elements used in social transactions therefore have an essential resemblance to sacrifices. They are real existents which are believed to have 'virtue', i.e. to elicit a desired social return, if given to certain classes of partners in certain circumstances. The purpose of the present investigation is to determine why beliefs in the 'virtue' of various objects of mediation are held among the Orokaiva.

It is readily admitted that the system I am studying here is *'un discours particulier, et dénué de bon sens'* and that it does not provide a classifactory scheme representing the universe. It merits the term 'system' only because each exchange cycle forms a system and success or failure in the use of objects of mediation is advanced by Orokaiva as an explanation of a great variety of interconnected event-structures in time. I shall return to these theoretical questions in the introduction to chapter VIII. It will be useful first to survey some of the more elementary Orokaiva magical recipes for effecting social exchange by means of gifts of land, taro and pigs.

2. *Land and its Transfer: Transactions between the Sexes*

The first object to be considered is land. A kind of standard profile of the general characteristics of New Guinea land tenure has already emerged from the

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writings of Berndt, Brookfield and Brown, Hogbin, Lawrence, Meggitt, Rappaport, Salisbury, Serpenti, Wagner and several others. The Orokaiva system falls within this general pattern, though with less emphasis on overriding rights held by clan and lineage, and more emphasis on individual rights than, for instance among the Siane and Mae Enga, less emphasis on corporate leadership than among the Garia, and more incidence of duality of rights than among the Chimbu, and so forth. Though the time has come when a comparative study of these systems could profitably be undertaken, it falls outside my present purpose which is to analyse the significance of land transactions, especially among the Orokaiva.

In order to carry out this analysis, we must first describe the basic categories of land transactions. We shall not use the term 'transactions' solely in a legal and economic sense, but more broadly in accordance with Mauss' concept of exchange as a total phenomenon. Thus, land enters crucially in 'transactions' between husbands and wives, and between men and spirits, and these 'transactions' will be considered before we turn to the more familiar topic of transactions between men. Here we have to distinguish between transactions within and outside the patrilineage. Our general argument will be that all of them occur as part of a continuing series of social exchanges, and that useholds granted on varying conditions must be regarded basically as benefits exchanged for other past or future benefits. In as much as paternal protection and filial service are very common objects of social exchange in these transactions, paternal protection being mediated by land grants, we may observe the practical operation of a system of patrifiliation.

A few words should first be said about the significance of land itself. The Orokaiva spend most of their days in their individual garden plots. They are tied to them not only by a total dependence on the produce, but also by deep bonds of affection. A man and his wife like nothing better, generally, than to spend the whole day, and virtually every day, in their garden together. These are intimate places where nobody would go without an invitation and where nobody is disturbed or called away except in a serious emergency. They are the most private places the Orokaiva has, much more private than the village houses where every sound and movement can be seen or overheard. Even so, physical privacy is secured often by no more than a narrow ring of second growth around the cultivations. Many people have a garden house, ornamental shrubs, places to rest and sit. Orokaiva gardens can be very homely and beautiful. People rest there in the heat of the day. They are favourite places for love-making.

The most ubiquitous of all social transactions mediated by the land occur between husband and wife. Perhaps the most important rights and obligations arising out of marriage have to do with garden land. Both the male and female gardening tasks are, of course, learnt before marriage. Bachelors have their own gardens in which they do all the work which is not specifically set aside for women and taboo to men. They clear the land; they help with planting (using the digging stick); they protect the land against pigs and other dangers; they weed. It is a fact, already observed by Williams, that a girl choosing a husband takes serious account of the state of the garden of her intended spouse. She does not like to marry a man whose garden is in a poor state. The bachelor is assisted by a sister, or brother's wife, or by his mother with the dropping of seed into the

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231 distinguishes wild pigs from domestic ones. Once the spirits have been effectively
825 expelled, the piglet *thereby* becomes domesticated. This means that it obeys the
[789] calls of its mother. It learns to forage in disused gardens but keeps away from
[775] growing taro. The piglet will not stray too far into the bush but comes home every night to be fed, and goes to sleep under the house.

Yet some danger of *sovai* contamination always remains. It may happen that a village pig stays away in the bush and does not return when its mother calls. The mother keeps on calling it from day to day, still hoping that it will return, but after a fortnight or a month it is accepted that the pig has gone wild. Or else it does return when the mother calls but returns to the bush as soon as it is fed.
[775] In all such cases people say that the spirits took the pig away and did not send it back.

These facts suggest an exchange cycle arising out of the following four notions: (1) A man turns into a *sovai* upon death. (2) *Sovai* entering pigs maraud gardens and attack humans. (3) A pig is domesticated by the driving out of the *sovai*. (4) Meat from the domesticated pig provides man with the *ivo* (strength) he needs for hunting pig. (This *ivo* makes man a dangerous *sovai* after death.) This cycle may be expressed as follows:

MODEL 22



431 Live domesticated pigs are not used a great deal for the mediation of social
231 exchange. Certainly the rearing of pigs enters widely into the exchange of
[462] prestations between the sexes, for it is a task women customarily perform for close kinsmen (husbands, brothers, sons). In addition it is not infrequent for piglets to be given to relatives and friends from different villages whose wives then rear them 'for the owner'. Salisbury (1962) noted a similar custom among
437 the Siane, but here the purpose was somewhat different. The Siane have feasts
231 at which 150–200 pigs are slaughtered. Here the recalling of lent pigs is an essential prerequisite for the holding of a feast and, indeed, feasts on this scale
[171] would be impossible unless the task of rearing was distributed among several villages. Orokaiva feasts involve far fewer pigs (seven, at a Hohorita feast, seemed normal). Admittedly, lending pigs for rearing does have an obvious economic advantage, similar to the one suggested by Salisbury: once the owner has lent a piglet to a man from another village, he finds it easier to resist demands that will be made from time to time by relatives who 'urgently' need a pig for purposes too compelling to ignore.

Basically, however, this institution is just another way of mediating social exchange. By lending a man a piglet one starts a partnership. The partner does not usually return the pig he has reared but instead gives a piglet which will in turn be reared by the original donor. One might say that the offspring of the donated pig returns to its 'mother's' village. In this way the institution of

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by a consanguine of either side, the proper side being determined by a medicine man (See Schwimmer 1969). The effect of this theory is that a woman belongs to her clan in a less absolute sense than a man.

This theory of paternity may be explained teleologically as serving to emphasise the rights and identity of the patrician in a social system which 'very nearly approaches' bilaterality. In Orokaiva society women very often receive a portion of patrimony land. Their indulgent brothers frequently give lands to their sister's children and such land may well pass into the hands of those children's heirs. Currently, over 50 per cent of cultivated land is owned by persons other than the cultivators, and very often the cultivator's useholds became perpetuated. Such perpetuation proceeds in spite of an explicit rule denying women hereditary rights to their patrimony useholds. The physiological reasoning by which Orokaiva women are denied full clan membership should therefore be interpreted as a symbolic statement insisting on the limits that should be placed upon uterine intrusion on clan property.

When Orokaiva informants are asked why women should not have hereditary rights over land, they usually give as the reason that a woman will marry into a strange clan and village so that it would be dangerous to give her children any rights. Such reasoning goes back to a time when the most frequent marriage forms were abduction and elopement. In practice, the fate of a woman's patrimony rights depends on where she marries: if she does marry in a friendly neighbouring village or by sister exchange, her children will probably keep her property. This is therefore the preferred feminine pattern. But if she is taken by a man from a strange village, her clan rights become precarious. We have already seen that this latter pattern of marriage is forced upon men not only by ecological contingencies but by the marriage rules themselves. Ideological devices to deny women full clan membership are consistent with this pattern. Such devices are inconsistent with restricted marriage exchange, because the latter system depends on the return of a woman's offspring to her natal clan as marriage partners in a later generation. In the Orokaiva system this is envisaged as only one of several structurally recognised possibilities.

8. *The Nature of Orokaiva Bridewealth*

The most convenient way of explaining the nature of Orokaiva bridewealth payments (*dorobu*) is by contrasting them with certain types of African bridewealth (*lobola*), as analysed by Lévi-Strauss.[2] Here the recipient applies the gifts, wholly or in large part, to the immediate purchase of wives for himself or his family. *Lobola 'n'est recu que pour commencer, aussitôt, un nouveau circuit . . . Il ne sera jamais consommé, sauf, occasionellement et partiellement, à des fins sacrificielles. A peine reçu, il fera l'objet d'un remploi, sous la forme d'une épouse pour le frère ou le cousin de la jeune marié* (1967:536). Under such a system it could rightly be said that *'la femme fournie en contrepartie est remplacée par une valeur symbolique'* and that the wife-giving families received in return *'la garantie, sous forme de biens privilégiés, de trouver elles-mêmes des épouses'* (*ibid.* 540).

Papuan bridewealth objects, however, cannot generally be applied to the same ends, or are not in practice generally so applied. The most important Orokaiva

C13 C23 individuals by creating and fulfilling obligations independently of other members of the descent group.

(iv) Landholding by the local patrilineal groups. After a closer look at landholding by the lineage, we will comment first on non-agnatic and adoptive relationships in connection with land acquisition and then on the interests in affiliation to the dispersed clan branch as a group associated with a territory.

In the instances recorded of title to subdivisions of a lineage's land having descended in 2 or more separate lines we refer to the landholders as members of distinct 'genealogical branches' of the lineage, even if the landholders are parallel cousins. The type of lineage we describe, however, is not characterized by regular internal structure, for often it is not easy to distinguish lineage from kinship in terms of function.

It is as true of the mountain Orokaiva as it is of most New Guinea Highland societies that [17] [611]

> the principle of recruitment to a man's father's group operates, but only concurrently with other principles and is sanctioned not by an appeal to the notion of descent as such but by reference to the obligations of kinsfolk, differentiated according to relationship and encompassed within a span of only two or three generations.
>
> (Barnes 1962:6)

C13 The solidarity of the current relationships between the males of the lineage can be regarded as a function of the closeness of the ties of agnatic kinship, real or adoptive but of close degree, which among the Jegase and Timumu[1] are effectively reduced to a lineal relationship between, at the most, 3 generations of householders. The strength of the readily noticeable identification of the lineage with an estate distinct from the land of the rest of the dispersed clan branch can be seen as a measure of the interdependence between these close agnates.

A lineage such as those in our sample is the largest group whose members co-ordinate their gardening activities to exploit land associated with it. But against this must be set the independence often exercised by individual lineage members, who, in consolidating other ties of their own, acquire and dispose of short-term landrights. Perhaps some individuals co-ordinate their activities with non-agnatic kin, affines and friends as much as with members of their own group.

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[1] Excepting the Bebahupa: all but 1 of its members (see b6) are descendants either of its oldest surviving man or of his father's brother.

621 At the time of resettlement these writers drew attention to the possibility that the composite villages would eventually be disrupted either by aggravated friction between members of different clans who had not lived together before or by the unsuitable siting of the settlements with regard to access to the villagers' own gardening lands.

[754 166] The first problem was solved by individual mobility. Our own experience which is confirmed by the observations of patrol staff is that fear of sorcery, which follows tension within the village, is one important example of the vicissitudes of social relationships which are responsible for much of the movement from one village to another at present.[1] But the problem of the location of gardens in relation to residence was solved in time wherever people moved from the main road or other temporary settlement areas to new sites on or near their old land.

This land use problem was peculiar to the exceptional resettlement conditions and Keesing seems not to have considered this point when he concluded that the formation of larger villages was incompatible with the economic base of shifting agriculture. His prediction that people would continually 'hive off' into hamlets of a dozen houses consistent with their familiar system of seasonal shifting gardens does not seem to have eventuated.

The scattering of an individual's land interests over a neighbourhood facilitates mobility between adjacent villages because after moving, for whatever reason, he can often continue to [166] exploit rights to those lands which are at a convenient distance from his new village. We found, however, no evidence to suggest that shifts of residence are determined by a continual need to clear new areas for cultivation even if these areas lie scattered near a number of villages.

171 241 361 Residential mobility is not as closely correlated with changes in gardening sites as it is among the Chimbu even though, as Williams says, the Orokaiva move their garden sites frequently. Among the Chimbu, on the other hand, where a long cultivation period usually of at least 4 years, sometimes broken by short fallow periods (when the area of cultivation within the plot is shifted), is followed by long fallow periods of varying length up to about 20 years (Brookfield and Brown 1963:52), 'the principal factor determining residence is land; most men prefer to live near their main blocks of currently cultivated land' (ibid:97).

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[1] Other examples are disputes between kin, and life-crises. About 1956 the oldest Bebehupa man left Binduta to spend his last years at Hahihita, an area to which he has been emotionally attached for much of his life. One or 2 close kin went to look after him and a series of other Bebehupa have followed.

241 With the passage of the cultivation cycle over a Chimbu sub-
171 clan's territory, gardeners move from one men's house to another,
361 either as a persisting group of agnates working contiguous holdings, or as individuals joining more transient groups which are dissolved as gardens near the house revert to fallow (ibid:98; Brown and Brookfield 1959:68). As they extended their cultivation to other areas, 37 per cent of a sample of 193 men had moved from one men's house to another over a period of 16 months (Brookfield and Brown 1963:98) and the men's houses themselves last no longer than 5 years (ibid:12).

241 In Sivepa on the other hand, gardens tend to be scattered and isolated. Father and son often have adjacent plots in one garden area but the son usually has at least 1 other garden elsewhere. A young married man often has 1 garden on the land of his wife's father, whom he will periodically assist in his garden. Older men in general adopt the technique of progressively planting and clearing a single large area while younger and more active men, usually with more obligations to affines, tend to cultivate several scattered smaller plots.

[621] There is no local group or extended kinship group which
[602] commonly combines to make a block of contiguous gardens. Even when all members of the village plant simultaneously for a special feast, the gardens are not adjacent. A man usually takes advantage of the choice of exercising planting rights on the land of a wide range of kinsmen (not necessarily his agnates), both those within the village and to a lesser extent kinsmen from other villages. Several had current gardens on their mother's brother's land, some on the nearby land of their wife's brother, sister's husband or daughter's husband.

613 In other Orokaiva areas (such as Inonda) gardeners of one
614 lineage often have a reciprocal arrangement with another lineage
184 of the same clan in the village to cultivate a parcel of their land with them, but this is not a common practice at Sivepa. In the few cases where several kinsmen have made adjacent gardens the gardeners are mostly cognatic kin from different clans or villages and each will probably make his next garden with different kin or on an isolated parcel.

166 Encroachment on boundaries is feared[1] but does not seem to
171 result in repeated changes of residence as it does among the
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[578] [1] The 3 instances of boundary disputes recorded were between Bebehupa and Usohu people. According to the older men the Usohu were formerly a Jegase group and they share many boundaries with the Bebehupa; the recent split in Binduta between the 2 groups has been accompanied by friction over a number of issues including the definition of boundaries.

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Table 5

Rights to land currently cultivated by the sample

Nature of planter's rights to the land currently gardened	No. of gardens	Area of gardens (acres)	
1. Planter is a member of lineage holding proprietary rights	15	9.17	
2. Member of a different lineage but same clan branch	5	2.57	
On land of planter or co-resident agnate			11.74
3. Member of a different clan within the same village	10	4.49	
4. Member of another branch of the same clan	1	0.10	
5. Member of a different clan and village	3	1.51	
On land of others			6.10
	34		17.84

Notes: 1. Of the 5 members of other clans or villages who were using the sample's land, 2 were using the land of their mother's brother's sons, 1 the land of his sister's son and 2 the land of members of their dispersed clan branch in a village other than their own.

2. For rights to land carrying cash-crops see Ch.4, Section c. and Ch.5, Section b.[A]

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Chimbu or to influence the choice of a garden site; a Sivepe man shares land boundaries with many gardeners but his prescriptive rights to his holdings are not so constantly jeopardized if he fails to cultivate his land while neighbours are using adjacent areas (see Brown and Brookfield 1959:25).

Moreover with short periods between successive cultivations and with necessarily extensive total areas used for cultivation a man claims to be able to fix boundaries on fallow land in some detail. These are either demarcated by large trees or shrubs at fixed points or coincide with the courses of the numerous creeks or with roads. The boundaries common to members of different clan branches appear to be neither more nor less clear than those shared by smaller groups.

[614]

A,[See Category 245, pp. 83-86; Category 249, pp. 87-93; Category 423, pp. 96-98--Analyst]

425 In such circumstances where the recipient and the original rightholder have lived in the same village or in neighbouring villages which are closely related and have worked together the land in question will be occupied by a person who has already established and maintained an accepted status in relation to the former landholder's group and who often has special relationships to particular kinsmen within it. At the time, accordingly, the transfer is to the recipient as an individual[1] and not to a [428] patrilineal group. After the passing of a generation however it will come to be regarded as part of the heritable territory of his agnates.

Moreover, there may be no immediate change in the use of the land involved and the extent of the rights being exercised may not be clarified for some time. In several cases we noted that a balance was eventually struck in dividing the land between claimants who were co-resident but distantly related patrikin of the deceased rightholder and those who were co-resident non-agnates.

Unfortunately, since our survey was short, we could gather little significant evidence of any disputes which may arise between parties with conflicting interest in such land. Our data include on the one hand instances where a transfer of rights still within memory has been confirmed over time and on the other the stated intentions of members of landholding groups as to the transmission of their rights.

Since the blocks involved are small and the fragmentation and interpenetration of the holdings of patrilineal groups is extensive, there is little concern for the maintenance of the continuity of the territory of these groups.[2]

These transfers which are prompted by individual needs and [428] demographic changes lend flexibility over time in the distribution of land which is a comparatively scarce resource. Population pressure has not resulted in greater conformity to the ideal system of patrilineal inheritance of available land.

171 (ii) Orokaiva and Chimbu land holding and residence compared.
121 We maintain that our account of the mountain Orokaiva shows not only the underlying contrast, in some respects, but also the significant characteristics in common with the Chimbu so that it

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[1] But in some cases a clear identification of the recipient may be arbitrary - e.g., to name him as either an affine or else a cognatic kinsman of the original holder is sometimes rather inaccurate, if the kin of these categories are father and son (see Appendix E, p.111).

[2] See Brookfield and Brown 1963:133.

A, [See Category 428, p.111--Analyst]

[7] [2] is appropriate to argue for the relevance of the hypothesis of Brown and Brookfield (Brookfield and Brown 1963:176-7;: Brown and Brookfield 1959:74-5) concerning the allocation of the land of Chimbu descent groups and the incorporation of non-agnates. They note that among the patrilineal Mae Enga the proportion of non-agnates allowed to reside on and use land in clan territory has been shown to decrease with an increase in population (Meggitt 1958:264) whereas this correlation does not hold for the territory occupied by the Chimbu clan.

In explanation they cite the facts that in Chimbu the major political-territorial unit, the tribe, has a larger membership than the Enga unit and contains not one but several exogamous clans. Political and ceremonial functions are concentrated in the exogamous Enga clan, which has sharply defined territorial boundaries. Only in Chimbu can land needs be easily accommodated in the political unit by means of land transfers between individual kin and affines in neighbouring clans, and it is significant that individual grants are more common means of redistributing land than among the Enga.

We will focus discussion of our evidence by proposing as a reasonable correlate of the largest Chimbu territorial and political unit the Orokaiva district, on the grounds that it was a territorially distinct unit within the tribe.[1]

The first premises assumed are that the scale of difference between Chimbus or Enga and the mountain Orokaiva in respect of pressure on productive land occupied by the heavy local concentrations of populations (e.g., in Orokaiva districts) is not of significance here; and that the characteristic method[2] of ensuring equitable distribution in both the Chimbu and Orokaiva landholding systems is by frequent transfers effected through interpersonal ties.

Moreover, several differences between the 2 societies should be noted:

(1) the district in our comparison may have included an estimated 1,000 persons as against 4,000 in some Chimbu tribes;

[6] [19] (2) unlike Chimbu there were no large-scale peace-time activities or ceremonial in which either the Orokaiva tribe or district emerged as a solidary unit (Brown and Brookfield 1959:5, 45 ff.);

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[1] We could have chosen the tribe, the inclusive effective political unit, without necessarily invalidating our comparison.

[2] Though not the only important method.

171 619 121 (3) the district had a compact territory (unlike the tribe) but its members were not all bound in mutual support in attack and defence, as were tribesmen in Chimbu where the motives of war and alliance and the territorial results of defeat were different;

614 171 121 (4) the Orokaiva clans which were scattered, often through several districts, did not have a single territorial focus and were radically different from a Chimbu clan; the latter is much more localised in a relatively continuous territory, may include 800 persons, preserves an internal solidarity and an opposition to others, and is probably the most stable social unit with its distinctive territorial and exogamic features. Clearly even a branch of an Orokaiva clan, which is the only group corresponding in significant respects, was only a fraction of the size, followed quite different settlement practices and, it seems, has long been non-exogamous (see Brown and Brookfield 1959:51, 55, 74; Brookfield and Brown 1963:11, 94, 98).

121 171 In the present study an adequate discussion of the hypothesis requires a demonstration that the same variables isolated in the analysis of the Highlands societies can be observed among the mountain Orokaiva. It is possible to state in terms relevant to the Orokaiva context the central issues involved in the accommodation or incorporation of non-agnates in patrilineal territorial groups and the function of the complex of interpersonal ties linking groups in the local community and in the political unit. Much of our earlier discussion has dealt with residence and local organization and we will not elaborate on the obvious points of contrast in patterns of settlement or territorial organization between these Orokaiva and the Chimbu (or Enga, etc.).

171 621 121 Over and above these differences there is in the principles of organization of the local communities of the 2 peoples an essential similarity which enables us to argue that in a sense the largest political and territorial units in neither society often include 'descent groups as distinct territorial units. Local units are often composed of parts of several descent groups, and descent groups are scattered in several localities' (Brookfield and Brown 1963:94; also Brown 1962:68). A further principle directly applicable in analysing the Orokaiva District is expressed in the assertion of a

> high correlation between proximity of clans and frequency of intermarriage [which] brings about a high proportion of ties of kinship and affinity between neighbouring clans.... Territorial distinctiveness

171 breaks down between [these] clans with land loans, gifts
121 and membership changes....

(Brookfield and Brown 1963:158)

621 Both peoples combine patrilineal descent and inheritance with a form of high residential mobility and flexible group affiliation. Within the tribe there is little difference between relationships with affines and relationships with kin in terms of ease of contact, friendliness and mutual assistance; within the local community containing members of several descent groups a solidarity is created by the characteristic multiplication of individual affinal and matrilateral relationships (see Brown and Brookfield 1959:54-6; Brown 1962:68; Brookfield and Brown 1963:78, 129, 132; Watson, ed. 1964:345-8, 352-5).

423 Individuality in land control is reinforced in both societies
171 by the absence of formal inherited positions of leadership and a pattern of interpenetrating territories is caused by processes of individual acquisition and retention (see Brookfield and Brown 1963:141, 156).

423 procedures for determining and recording titles were amenable to local regulation and adjustment by the institution conducting the registration. This does not mean that more than one type of right need be guaranteed or that security of title is unimportant.

657 A registration scheme would function best as a mechanism for
423 resolving uncertainties over landrights in other areas where it could enhance the productivity of large blocks of land by rationalising the overlapping claims of members of 2 or more clans. Due to the extensive fragmentation and subdivision of group territories around Sivepe and the restrictions which have been imposed on the scale and range of the past movements of groups, there were no
[578] apparent conflicts in the locality over rights at the clan branch level. The current incidence of interpersonal disputes affected only a few small parcels and did not seem to be a persistent obstacle to productivity.

[425] The question is now of reduced significance as the Higaturu Council scheme has been superseded by more comprehensive provisions for land tenure conversion. Nevertheless, registration of permanent individual rights, whether on a person's own land or another's, is desirable in order to preclude disputes which might otherwise arise once the value of the land is increased by the introduction of permanent improvements in the form of cash crops.

121 We contend that it is legitimate to extrapolate our local in-
[171] formation by assuming extensive social and cultural uniformity among the mountain Orokaiva. Analysis of tenure practices and territorial organization of Sivepe groups shows that in important respects the landholding systems resemble those characteristic of certain closely-settled unilineal communities of which Chimbu might be considered the type. We therefore maintain that modern mountain Orokaiva land tenure and local organization differ considerably from the model introduced in outline by Williams in his original monographs (1925, 1928, 1930).

179 Finally, we wish to indicate the general significance of the
423 type of council scheme for land registration discussed here, and this is best done by quoting at length from the report of the Mission from the International Bank. It claimed (1964:33) that solutions to land tenure problems in Papua-New Guinea would be found more readily if greater responsibility were placed 'on the native people, including the local Government Councils, to work out their own solution adapted to varying circumstances'.

This would not mean the recording of title under standard European procedures and would 'require comparative flexibility on the part of the credit organization designed to assist and stimulate native production. On this approach there could be much delegation of responsibility' among government staff and 'much

[73] [433] than might have been expected.[1] However, the withdrawal of the relief teams, including agricultural officers, after the emergency, may have left the people in a psychologically and technologically deprived state, thus further inhibiting their concern with commerce.

[178] [171] The instability of settlement consequent upon these disturbances may also have impeded the evolution of such new forms of leadership and effective group action as have occurred among the Tolai.[2] The careers of such new leaders as were emerging, perhaps with wider group loyalties, have frequently ended catastrophically at important points.[3]

[177] [799] [657] (iii) Lack of co-ordination between the Anglican mission and the Administration. Keesing (1952:21-2) refers to the 'delicate' matter of 'Government versus Mission responsibilities' and alludes to the 'rivalry' between them in connection with the post-Lamington rehabilitation programme.[4] These two agencies are the most potent external forces operating on Orokaiva society and their activities and demands are not co-ordinated, thus accentuating the difficulties of implementing a consistent development policy. Their demands on the villagers' time may conflict, and their views on such important matters as the purpose of education, the role of the teacher and the role of commerce are at variance. The Anglican mission has no formal representation at the policy-making levels in the District though it has great influence in the villages.

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[1] Sjoberg, an authority on disaster research, states (1962:363): 'A typical adaption [to disaster in pre-literate societies] is resignation to one's fate. When catastrophe is thought to be engendered primarily by spiritual forces, man can himself do little to alter the course of events apart from recourse to religious and/or magical practices. Recall that he assumes the immutability of the natural-divine order, which includes also the social arrangements about him. Add to this the meagerness of technological know-how of the sort that would be useful in disaster rehabilitation and we see that mute acceptance of one's lot is the logical result.'

[2] See Salisbury 1962:338.

[3] For instance, the 'renegade' leaders hanged at Higaturu and Sangara; the administrative staff, teachers and the twenty priests-in-training who died at Higaturu in the Mt Lamington eruption, and the Orokaiva leader of the co-operative movement who also died at that time. [166] Many of the most talented Orokaiva are serving outside the region in government, missions and commerce.

[4] Belshaw (1951:248) makes a similar allusion.

24 [433] holdings of commercial trees are not fully, and sometimes not at all, exploited by the owners.[1]

Most have been established on land cleared for the purpose and are seldom interplanted with subsistence crops. However, a 'catch crop' of taro, sweet potato or corn may be taken from the newly cleared land before planting coffee or cocos and it is only now becoming common to plant commercial trees in subsistence gardens after the food crops have been harvested.[2]

245 The techniques of cultivating and processing cash crops within the village are simple. Coffee is sold in parchment form. In most cases the cherries are pulped by stamping in a creek to split them open, and then the beans are removed by hand and washed. Some villages possess pulping machines. After fermenting for about twenty-four hours in wooden containers, the beans are washed again and sun-dried. A few people erect drying platforms but most simply spread the beans on sleeping-mats in the village square. The buying agency rejects parchment that has not been adequately dried but no price differentials are applied. The coffee season extends from about March to October and people may begin weeding some weeks 474 beforehand. OCCS announces the season's coffee price (as determined 245 by world market conditions) some weeks before buying commences, but few producers learn it in advance and, since they need to begin harvesting a month or two before the time of sale, the element of uncertainty may deter them from maintenance and harvesting even in years of high prices. All coffee is purchased by the society, which is sometimes prevented from buying by lack of funds, lack of transport, or by the poor state of the roads. Buyers may visit only once a month or less.[3] There is scope for an immediate quadrupling of production from existing trees,[4] and more active campaigns and perhaps additional buyers might help achieve this.

245 Cocos, like coffee, is maintained, if at all, by occasional clearing of grass and weeds from around the trees. Harvesting is carried out immediately before sale - if possible, on the same day.

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[1] The coffee trees in Popondetta sub-district in 1963 should have yielded about 200 tons of polished coffee, but the actual level of output was only 41 tons (DASF, Popondetta, File 1-6-A(4)).

● [171] [2] This practice was followed by indigenous smallholders in Malaysia and Indonesia for two decades and resulted in the planting of millions of acres of rubber by the 1930s. See, for instance, Thomas 1965:101.

[3] In marked contrast to the more densely populated and more accessible parts of the highlands where competition among buyers is keen and some routes are visited daily.

[4] See footnote 1 on this page.

433 hunting. The little time devoted to the preparation of tools for
512 the main subsistence enterprises reflects the degree of technological substitution which has occurred since contact.

Construction and repair of houses normally continues throughout the year, here occupying 1.6 hours per man-week. In Sivepe such activity declined during the course of the survey as plans were formulated to transfer the village to the new site. Of 13 houses whose occupants were not newcomers to the village, 4 were completely rebuilt during the year and, in addition, 2 completely new houses were built and a number of extensions and repairs made to others. This 'crude birth rate' suggests the life of a house to be about
[342] 3.25 years. Since each house takes about 110 man-hours to build (including the gathering of materials), about 0.6 hours per man-week must be devoted to reconstruction in a normal year. In Sivepe about 0.9 hours were devoted as a result of additional houses being built, the balance (0.7 hours) accounting for repairs and minor extensions.

[252] Household tasks occupy 5.3 hours per man-week, cooking predominat-
[462] ing with 5.0 hours. Of necessity, they vary little through the year.[1] Much of the time taken up by cooking involves simply tend-
[372] ing the fire on which the food is being prepared and it is then that the women often work on their string bags. Most firewood is obtained as a by-product of clearing, suitable lengths of timber being stacked in the garden to dry out and then carried to the village as required.

All the above subsistence activities (food production, construction, handicraft work and household tasks) can be described as 'productive' in that 'the purposeful alteration and combination of physical material' (Udy 1959:2) can be discerned in them. Together they account for 26.6 out of the total of 30 hours per man-week devoted to the subsistence sector of the economy.

512 Only 3.4 hours per man-week are spent in fulfilling social
182 obligations. Although categorised here as non-productive activity, it should be stressed that ritual and informal social interaction are part of the fabric of the total economic system and the kinship networks which form the framework for these interactions serve as the major mechanism for distributing goods produced within the subsistence economy.

171 Belshaw, in discussing Melanesian exchange, states (1965:35):
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> A primary point to note is that a very high proportion of social contacts between adults is accompanied by gift-giving.

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[1] The figure for cooking in period I is an estimate, derived from averaging the figures for the following periods, since relevant records were not initially kept.

> Between friends who visit one another or who meet on a path, this may amount to little more than proferring an areca nut or piece of tobacco, much as we might offer a cigarette, but with a more definite expectation that it will be done. If the purpose of the visit is a little more serious, or if it is to be extended, the gift may be of food, and certainly a host will offer meals....

He further stresses that such small transactions may be as central to the economy as the more complex ceremonialised institutions involving reciprocal exchange. Simply because such transactions and associated activities are of a moral rather than a mechanical nature and incorporate notions of social status, they cannot properly be distinguished from strictly 'productive' enterprise.

In Sivepe time devoted to fulfilling social obligations is divided almost equally between the three categories of death (mourning), 1.1 hours, other ceremonial (feasting, farewell parties, etc.), 1.0 hours, and informal visiting, 1.2 hours per man-week.

While the pattern of visiting varies little from week to week, the more formal activities only occur irregularly. Only one death, that of a child, was recorded within the sample during the survey, but various people were involved in the deaths of four kinsmen resident elsewhere.

The duration of mourning seems to vary in relation to the physical and social distances separating the mourned from the mourners as well as according to the status of the deceased. In the case of the child's death, 90 per cent (all but four members) of the sample participated, together with a large number of clansmen from other villages and most of the third clan represented in Sivepe. The sample members mourned continuously for an average of 11 hours each, this being terminated by a church service on the mission station. In fact, all the mourning during period I fell in four weeks, an average of 5.5 hours per man-week being recorded for these weeks.

The time devoted to other ceremonial activities can be subdivided into four categories, the relative importance of which reflects the nature of social change among the inland Orokaiva. 'Parties' account for 38 per cent of the time so spent. These are normally held at the departure or return of kinsmen in paid employment or to mark 'birthdays' and are invariably characterised by the sale of plates of food and liquor and by western-style dancing to guitar groups.[1] Another 30 per cent of the time is devoted to traditional

[1] The term 'party' is in current usage in Orokaiva and other New Guinea languages. For a detailed description of one such event, see Crocombe 1966.

433 179 attempts are being made to expand and diversify cash cropping by planting more coffee and erecting a communal copra-drier in Inonda and establishing a communal garden in Sivepe. However, in all of them, serious problems have arisen or the venture has actually been abandoned. These facts point to a certain lack of direction and perception of the most appropriate techniques in the development of commercial agriculture.

(b) The relationship of subsistence to the external sector and the availability of surplus labour

433 178 Perhaps the most significant general conclusion to emerge from this survey of activity patterns is that the Orokaiva economy continues to be essentially tradition-oriented. Such monetary activities as exist seem to be additional to, and do not replace, subsistence activities. Although the two villages have, since contact, been incorporated into a wider system, individual participation in it remains essentially passive. There is now a real need for money, and for the products that money can buy, and commercial production within the village is perceived as one way of satisfying these needs. Because of the people's familiarity with cash cropping, and of the under-utilisation of available labour, it is not easy to see why it should not have been more extensively adopted.

There is plenty of evidence that the villages continue to be tradition-oriented. In particular, there is little suggestion of 'a reduction in the acreage under subsistence crops, a narrowing of the normal range of good crops and changes in their relative importance' or 'of a reappraisal of the agricultural value of different types of land and soil' or of 'the movement of whole villages to new sites...the movement of individuals from villages which are poorly located for commercial farming to those which are more favourably situated...[and] the departure of individuals or nuclear families from the village to become independent farmers' as have been indicated by Ward (1964:487-93) in the case of Fiji. No distinct socio-economic groups have emerged at the village level. By contrast, in a recent study of village agriculture in Aitutaki, Cook Islands, three economic groupings are identified - the gardeners, gardener-employees (those with part-time jobs) and employee-gardeners (holding full-time positions) - this breakdown in the homogeneity of the communities being considered as one measure of the degree of commercialisation of the economy (Johnston 1967:36-8 and 91-3). Finally, there is as yet no evidence of individual specialisation where 'The planter restricts and narrows his activities in two directions: he concentrates upon agriculture to the exclusion of non-agricultural activities and on cash crops to the exclusion of non-cash crops' (Johnston 1967:60).

[565] [171]

361 178 166 Rimoldi, in investigating the recent history of settlement among the Mt Lamington Orokaiva (1966:39-47 and 65-70), distinguishes

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Nevertheless it is incorrect to apply Salisbury's proposition (1962:216-20), that the change from a stone to steel technology in the New Guinea Highlands has resulted in a saving of two-thirds in the time allocated to specified axe-using tasks, as further evidence for labour availability. Apart from the fact that the proposition itself is not based on quantitative data and must be regarded only as a hypothesis, if, for the sake of discussion, the factor of 3 be applied to time spent in clearing, fencing and construction (the main axe-using tasks) in Sivepe and Inonda, an additional 10.8 and 11.6 hours per man-week respectively would be required for the work with a stone technology. Since 10.7 hours in Sivepe and 10.0 in Inonda are already being directed to the external sector each man-week virtually all the labour time made available as a result of this technological change is in fact being utilised.

While there is no evidence from the activity patterns to suggest any seasonal conflict in the labour requirements of cash and subsistence cropping there is, nevertheless, some inconclusive data from both villages to suggest that a substantial extension of cash-producing activities would conflict with the requirements of the subsistence sector. In Sivepe the processing of coffee - the most labour intensive of all cash cropping work - and the harvesting of rubber typically occur early in the day and so before the start of the normal daily routine, suggestive of the fact that extra time is 'made' to carry out these tasks.[1] At Inonda it appears that where a household head engages in full-time employment for more than two or three weeks the family finds difficulty in maintaining its food gardens and so meeting all its obligations.

[245] [249]

Given that the development of cash cropping bears a direct relationship to activity patterns the data suggest the basic issue to be not one of absolute availability of labour but rather of the organisation of labour and time. The hypothesis is suggested that in a primarily subsistence-oriented economy, those cash-producing activities which do not demand a significantly different and longer work routine will be preferred. The basic feature of this routine is that one activity need not be pursued to the exclusion of others and each can be interrupted at will. So the Orokaiva working day (and week) encompasses a wide range of tasks, each pursued for only a relatively short period of time. As with the Aitutaki villagers of the Cook Islands, 'commercialization has led to few appreciable innovations in the cropping system, land tenure, technology or labour' (Johnston 1967:68).

[171] [178]

The present relative adjustment of cash to subsistence cropping may only be a temporary feature of the village economy and the fact

[1] However, a higher yield of latex is also obtained by tapping early in the day.

8: Waddell & Krinks E-4,5 (1964-1965) 1968 QJ23 Orokaiva QJ23

(b) The commitment to cash

437 Among the Orokaiva money serves to fulfil commitments to the external sector of the economy, to add variety to the diet and to acquire substitutes for those items of the traditional technology no longer produced. In these respects there is a manifest commitment to cash, but at the present level of acquisition there is insufficient available to effect major improvements in the standard of living. While Orokaiva priorities for its use may differ from those preferred by an innovating agency it is scarcely possible to speak of 'inappropriate systems of consumption which act as obstacles [71] to increasing production and commercialisation'.[1] The available data demonstrate the absolute insignificance of large ceremonial exchanges and, in this respect, the Orokaiva, as observed, do not conform to the pattern generally described in the ethnographic literature dealing with other traditional societies. In the absence of a developed market economy and the scarcity of its basic prerequisite, cash, reciprocal exchanges based on kinship serve as an effective means of exploiting the resources available to the several socio-economic groups and of providing an important measure of social security.

The analysis of activity patterns has demonstrated the two communities to be primarily subsistence oriented. Data on exchange reveal that, while much cash is acquired independent of direct productive effort, the requirements of subsistence largely dictate the manner in which it is utilised. This consideration applies to members of all the socio-economic categories where, for example, wage earners are unable to provide accommodation for their dependents and ex-servicemen settlers have inadequate resources of capital and labour to develop their holdings satisfactorily. It would appear that it is the villagers' concept of subsistence itself, and their assumption that it is both distinct from commercial activities and that viability at this level must be achieved prior to involvement in the latter, which is central to the problem of development rather than simply considerations of mechanisms of exchange or availability of labour. It is because of this that the issue of 'marketing' subsistence products among kin emerges as a crucial one to the Orokaiva.

[p.284 is blank]

[1] See p.182.

000 rates of pay than do the plantations. There is, however, disagreement between the indigenes and the mining company regarding the future distribution of profits from the copper.

361 Although there is a marked similarity in the structure of buildings in the two areas, settle-
●171 ment groupings are dissimilar, partly because of topographical differences but particularly as a result of the recent changes which have occurred in the Yega pattern of settlement.

121 The third area of study, that of the indigenous community in Port Moresby, is distinct. It has been included because more and more village people, particularly young educated men, are choosing to live and work in towns and it is rightly recognized that, although the towns contain only a small fraction of the Territory's population, the people living in them are the most politically sophisticated, vocal in their dissatisfaction of their present status and, of all the country's inhabitants, most susceptible to propaganda. The distinction is made in this section between those indigenes who are the traditional inhabitants of the land where Port Moresby now stands, and those whose lands are elsewhere but who now live and work in the town. It is this latter group that is classified as indigenous migrants.

[P4-B)

353 *tapa* cloths, also worn on ceremonial occa-
[415] sions; often nowadays mother's best dress and father's best shorts and shirt are also kept in this box. Everyday tools—fishing spears, pig spear, bush knife, and axe—are stored between the floor joists under the floor platform. A
[372] bundle of dry firewood may be stored under the house in case of a prolonged spell of wet
[227] weather. The dwelling of each clan fishing-leader is easily recognized by the large seine net hung to dry under the eaves or rolled in a corner of the verandah.

342 The Yega build one other form of dwelling, a garden shelter (*dobo*) usually roughly constructed with leaf walls, frequently open at one end and often so low from floor to roof that a person cannot stand erect in it. A *dobo* is a temporary dwelling, built near the swidden in current use, and used by a man and his family for up to a week at a time while they are working in their gardens, which may be three or four miles from the village. The *dobo* is also used to shelter from rain or to take a siesta during shorter, one-day visits to the garden.

343 A *gaga* is simply a talking platform where
[461] men sit for a chat, a chew (of betelnut) or a
[614] smoke during siesta time, or after the day's work is done. There is usually at least one *gaga* for each clan in a village. The *gaga* per-
[627] forms an important social function for it is
[584] here that quarrels are settled, marriages arranged, and the everyday problems and business of the village discussed and finalised.

291 Everyday clothing is a pair of shorts and maybe a shirt or a singlet for boys and men, and a cotton dress or skirt for girls and women.
[287] The traditional body covering for both men and women was beaten out bark-cloth of the paper mulberry tree. This is used throughout
[171] the Pacific and is known as *tapa*. *Tapa* skirts and loin cloths are still worn on special occasions, such as weddings and New Year sing-sings, while many older people wear *tapa* to
323 church on Sundays. The Yega and their neigh-
[289] bours are expert tapa-makers but they did not have either the suitable clay or the art of pot-
439 making. They used to trade their *tapa* for pots from Ambasi, thirty miles to the north, and
[178] from Wanigela, 100 miles to the south. This trade has now declined because everybody can

[P.11-A)

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 12-A]

19: Schwimmer E-5 (1966-1970) 1979 OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23

NOTES

The data presented here were gathered in the Northern Province of Papua New Guinea in summer 1970 with the help of a research grant from the Canada Council. The paper was first presented at a seminar at the Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago. I thank faculty and students at that seminar for their comments, which have led to clarifications of the text.

[1] This article does not discuss what I believe semiotic anthropology to be and what is its relation to French structuralism. The reader is referred to Schwimmer 1977.

[2] It was suggested to me that 'translation rules' may be what Peirce called 'motivations'. Upon reflection, I would suggest that all the constitutive rules of ritualised prestations are concerned with motivations. For instance, taros displayed on a platform at a wedding could be regarded as motivated signs because they are conspicuously part of an 'institution'. If we need a semiotic analogy for 'translation rules', we might say they specify the relation between expression form and expression content in Hjelmslev's sense (1963), where the prestation as message is the expression form and the sentiment immanent in the prestation is the expression content.

[3] MacCormack (1975) rightly remarked on the gap in my monograph (Schwimmer 1973) in respect of the Orokaiva's own rules about reciprocity. There was no reason to expect that he should have been aware that I presented a paper about these rules (Schwimmer 1970). The present article incorporates the main data of that paper, as well as of a later paper presented in Paris in 1974, on the occasion of a conference of French and Canadian ethnographers at the Musée des Arts Populaires.

[4] Two tribes neighbouring Orokaiva have myths concerning figures closely resembling Javaite Poromo, but far from being simple moral tales, these are elaborate myth cycles whose heroes, Wasis for the Ai'i and Ine for the Omie, are said to be the principal exemplars for the 'big man' system in those tribes. Data on these myth cycles were gathered by two Toronto graduate students, namely T. N. Barker for the Ai'i and M. Rohatynskyj for the Omie.

[5] See for instance Fortune (1935) for Manus and Meggitt (1967: 1971) for Mae Enga.

[6] The story is in F. E. Williams's Notebooks now stored in the government archives at Port Moresby and the property of the government of Papua New Guinea. Cf. Notebook W 56 for 1923, quoted in Schwimmer 1973: 140.

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614 182 not unlikely to meet her request. Her brother's children will fear her constant demands and her threats of sorcery. Her actual power is so great that a religious construct, proclaiming her social distance from the men of the clan, and making her look low and insignificant, may help somewhat to keep the embattled [842] clan patrimony together. It is therefore tempting to treat Orokaiva parthenogenesis theory as offering further evidence for the tension between patrilateral and matrilateral kin, though this tension could be demonstrated more easily by less esoteric means.

114 ● 171 842 The Orokaiva case makes one wonder just what constitutes 'knowledge of physiological paternity'. Leach writes about 'basic facts of physiological paternity' (1967: 41) which anyone but an idiot would know. On the other hand, Spiro speaks of a 'theory' and compares 'physiological paternity' to the 'heliocentric universe' (1968: 244)—the latter was a theory that man did not have until the fifteenth century. Spiro does not quite indicate at what point in time mankind obtained 'knowledge' of the former theory, but he evidently thinks it was well before the birth of Jesus. I am not sure just how Spiro would classify the case of the Orokaiva: are they 'ignorant' of physiological paternity or not? Are they less ignorant than the Trobrianders but more ignorant than the Dobuans (who do not believe in virgin birth at all)? Do not all these groups derive their theory on this subject in precisely the same way, namely in the context of a metaphysical cognitive system? It seems to me that a significant difference between the Melanesians and modern man, if it exists at all, does not lie in the substantive content of their theory of physiological paternity, but in the capacity of modern man to show by empirical evidence that the Trobrianders are wrong, the Dobuans right and the Orokaiva in between. As for the contemporaries of Jesus, they seem to resemble the Melanesians rather than modern man, in that they had no such empirical evidence.

121 I think that in primitive thought we should distinguish between empirical generalisations, which may often imply no more than a rough statistical correlation, and deductive theories [813] implying causal connexions. It is notorious [824] that primitive thought will easily move from the former to the latter, as the Orokaiva do, for instance, when they note that *tauga* leaves fall while the main taro crop is coming up and postulate that it is the dropping *tauga* leaves that cause the crop to prosper. There is no reason to believe, however, that the Orokaiva *invariably* make a causal theory out of an empirical correlation and they may even omit to do so where modern thought would applaud such a step. A person may 'know' as

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121 an empirical generalisation that sexual intercourse and conception often go together, and that the latter tends to follow upon the former, without proceeding from this 'basic fact' to the 'theory' that conception is caused by sexual intercourse.

114 This point has already emerged from the debate between Leach, Spiro and Kaberry when Kaberry showed evidence that the tribes she studied 'had no idea of the true relation between sexual intercourse and conception' while she admitted that these tribes know empirically that sex relations are a necessary preliminary to pregnancy. She made the valuable point that her informants' empirical knowledge does not logically entail a 'correct' theory of procreation. The Orokaiva case again illustrates that such empirical knowledge may serve as a building block for a wide range of soundly constructed though perhaps 'incorrect' causal theories.

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113 Leach, E. R. 1967. Virgin birth. *Proc. R. anthrop. Inst.* 1966, 39–49.

Spiro, Melford E. 1968. Virgin birth, parthenogenesis and physiological paternity: an essay in cultural interpretation. *Man* (N.S.) 3, 242–61.

[P.133-B]

665 the women's club there was a concern of the acculturated faction and
562 arguments about it were on factional lines. But in Sivepe, it was quite a novelty for the women to have a political cause of their own (they had to inveigle the men into building them a clubhouse) and they discussed the various ways in which they could exert pressure (refuse to sleep with them, etc.). All this was on a rather unserious level, although the secretary of the club, whose circumstances I have described, depended rather heavily on the club for a secure status in her new village. Later, when all the women were practising the kere every night, the same tug of war re-established itself. Traditionally, married women do not dance much or at all; some husbands grumbled because the wives did not stay home in the evening, came home very late, left them with the babies, made a "lot of noise." In all this, there was a feeling that the status of women was rising--and the mission encouraged this as well as the government. More important, the women were acting as a group, under a leader, which may not have been common at an earlier time.

121 To what extent can one speak, in these villages, of factionalism? This term is used in a bewildering number of ways. Ralph Nicholas has recently tried to clarify it by five nominal propositions: according to him, factions are (1) conflict groups, (2) political groups, (3) not corporate groups. Faction members are recruited (4) by a leader and (5) on diverse principles. (1965: 27-29) Nicholas stresses that factions, in his sense of the term, lack the permanence of corporate groups, and that they may, in fact, arise in just one conflict situation, to evaporate again soon after. Alternatively, they may last for a very long time. I noticed a profound difference
665 between the working of factions among the New Zealand Maori and the
●[171] Orokaiva. When a conflict situation arises among the Maori, including any disagreement at all between two persons of different families, familiar alignments at once reassert themselves. The lines of cleavage tend to be predictable; furthermore, a large number of people are apt to take sides along this predictable lines of division. Among the
[578] Orokaiva, each side tended to have only a small number of predictable protagonists. The rest would remain indifferent, and if the conflict became serious enough for them to participate, the alliances, at least in Sivepe, were hardly ever repeated from one occasion to the next. Factionalism in Sivepe was therefore, to a large extent, fugitive.

There were, of course, disputes that would divide the whole of a village along clan lines, or that would divide a larger body of contestants along village lines. I would tend, with Nicholas, to speak here of conflicts between corporate groups rather than factionalism.

Yet there are confusions here that still need to be cleared up. What Nicholas calls a "corporate group" is corporate only in respect of certain functions, even though these may be very diffuse, as in the case of kinship groups. But if conflict occurs over matters arising

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cept of friendship which *excludes* kin. The quality of *philia* can bind together kin and non-kin alike. He does not exclude purely political and economic forms of *philia*, though he regards them as being on a lower level; that is, useful but not necessarily pleasant or good. In this essay, I shall disregard them, restricting myself to relationships in which intrinsic benefits are exchanged.

In addition to kin relations, then, *philia* includes a residual category of affective relations between non-kin. In the first instance, I shall define friendship as this residual category. I recognize the feebleness of such a definition and can understand why Paine (this volume, pp. 117–37) rejected it. There can, in fact, be only one justification for setting up this residual category, and that is that our analysis is able to reveal in it a structural principle.

My main purpose in this essay is to demonstrate how we can arrive at such order or structure in one specific case: the Orokaiva of the Northern District of Papua. But the entire discussion requires the use of concepts which are by no means familiar from previous literature. Hence, I have provided a preliminary survey of some empirical illustrations of these concepts. First, if we make a conceptual distinction among *philia*, friendship, and kinship so that the *philia* set is always equal to the sum of the friendship and kinship sets, then four real possibilities exist: 1) there may be no friends at all (but I know of no cases of this supposedly primitive pattern in Oceania); 2) all persons designated as 'friends' are primarily classified as 'kin'; 3) all persons designated as 'kin' are primarily classified as 'friends'; and 4) there are two sets of persons known to every individual who classify some persons exclusively as friends and some as kin.

Secondly, a society may have a notion of *philia*, but it may classify the members of the *philia* universe by criteria other than the presence or absence of consanguinity. Theoretically, there could be an infinite number of ways of subdividing the *phila* universe, but let us limit ourselves to three: 1) consanguinity is the basic criterion; 2) consanguinity is no criterion; 3) consanguinity is only one criterion among many.

I shall clarify these preliminary points by illustrations from different parts of Oceania.

OCEANIC NOTIONS ABOUT KINSHIP AND FRIENDSHIP

Theoretically, we might expect to find in all societies three different systems of discourse about social associations: a kinship system, a friendship system, and the more comprehensive *philia* system. In practice, we may find a good deal of overlapping in specific societies, but even then, the distinction between the three systems may prove to be analytically profitable.

For instance, some societies do not have a distinctive membership group outside the kin group where *philia* relations are maintained. An example

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171 would be the New Zealand Maori who insist on tracing kinship before they begin any significant social association. Thus, they have (or had, until recently) no friends whom they could not define as kinsmen. Yet, this requirement does not greatly restrict their choice of associates as their range of kinship recognition is extremely wide. Erudite Maori can recite genealogies of sometimes over twenty generations in length, counted ambilaterally. They use sophisticated techniques by which host and guest can explore and discover where they "link up."

Although the kinship idiom is always dominant in formal contexts, the Maori also have a friendship idiom which is frequently employed in informal situations. The word *hoa* (meaning friend, mate) is in no sense a kinship term and does not imply kinship. It is used between persons of same or opposite sex but usually only within the same generation. One frequently hears it between husband and wife. Unlike the kinship terms, it does not connote relative seniority (*tuakana/teina*) but is reciprocal. It signifies a relatively unrestrained, warm, affectionate, cooperative, equal, personal, and private relationship. The fact that it carries no connotation of kin obligations makes it suitable for easy informal discourse. There is thus no category of persons called *hoa*, but we do find an idiom of reference and address that expresses friendship.

Pending a full study of the Maori *philia* system,[3] we may deduce that there are two main principles involved: first, the totally inclusive genealogy of the world to which Levi-Strauss alludes (1962), and secondly, the relatively large but carefully delimited cooperative group with its mythologically ordained land boundaries. Competitive exchange between these groups is a fact of life but it is glossed over on the level of the model which emphasizes genealogical connection and brotherhood, as might be expected in a segmentary system where the competitors are always ready to rally against an external enemy.

Theoretically, there is a second type of system that may be adopted if no distinction between kin and non-kin is made within the *philia* universe. It is possible to emphasize the friendship idiom – or the history of valued associations – and to limit to the utmost the use of the kinship idiom. A brief reference by Craig (1969:177) suggests that this is the system of the Telefolmin of the Western Highlands of New Guinea. Like the Maori, the Telefolmin are cognatic and recognize a wide kinship network; but they have little interest in genealogy and have no clear-cut pattern of segmentation. In their social relationships, they do not think in terms of kin and non-kin, but in terms of "friends" (that is, kin with whom there is a long history of close association) and strangers (who may be known kin).

3 A full study of Maori social structure remains to be done, but the classical data are summarized in many sources; see especially Biggs, 1960; Firth, 1929; Makereti, 1938. For the contemporary structure, see Hohepa, 1964; Metge, 1964; Schwimmer, 1969.

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171 This difference in the emphasis placed by the Maori and the Telefolmin on kinship and friendship idioms can be explained by ecological, demographic, and ideological factors. Telefolmin cooperative alliances are very small, most of them being no larger than the extended family. Thus, all the emphasis is placed upon the exchange relations between these small groups whose security is based on highly flexible, unstable inter-group coalitions.

The Maori and Telefolmin cases are illuminating as they show that it does not suffice, in the present study, to analyse membership groups, but that we must also distinguish between idioms of discourse even where no distinctive kin and non-kin groups are present in the *philia* universe. In many Oceanic societies, however, we do find such discrete categories, the fullest published account of the friendship category being Burridge's work on the Tangu (especially 1957a, 1969).

Tangu distinguish two relationship systems, each with its own terms of reference and address, its own rules of recruitment and inheritance, and its own positive and negative marriage rules. Where kinship is recognized, persons always use the kin idiom (Burridge, 1965:227). Where kinship is not recognized, a choice exists between two terms of reference. A man may have a hereditary friendship with *kwaver*, a term not found in the kin terminology system, or with *mwerkindanger*, a term equivalent to brother-in-law in the kinship idiom. Whichever is used, the friendship system is formally free of the obligations characteristic of the kin categories. Unfortunately, the data are not clear as to the criteria used in choosing between the two friendship terms when establishing a relationship. We are told, however, that a *kwav* relationship must be converted into a *mwerkindang* before intermarriage is possible (and then only in the next generation).

As for the total system of Tangu *philia*, Burridge (1965:226) classifies all male collateral relationships as being either cooperative alliances or group exchange relationships. The folk model for a cooperative alliance is the relationship elder brother/younger brother; the group exchange model is the relationship existing between married siblings of different sexes (between brothers-in-law or *mwerkindanger*). Communities tend to be divided structurally into "roughly equivalent halves"; within each half, resources are pooled under the loose control of a manager. Between the two halves, competitive exchange relations prevail, emphasizing the equivalence of prestations. Conflicts lead to a re-arrangement of personnel between the halves whose membership is never wholly determined by kinship (Burridge, 1957b).

Terms such as brother and brother-in-law in the Tangu language refer to patterns of behaviour rather than to biological relations. Thus, a younger brother who is unduly competitive in his behaviour towards his older brother is *classified* as *mwerkindanger*; the wife of a friend with whom ego establishes a *mwerkindang* relationship is called sister and is treated as a sister. Thus,

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●171 if a man decides to visit the village of his friend (*mwerkindang*), he will tell his own people, "I am going to my sister."

Burridge shows that Tangu undoubtedly have special friendship institutions, and that in these relationships, one does not make the same claims and demands that are made among kinsmen; indeed, an ideology prevails in which gifts between friends are free. Thus, a real brother-in-law would be more demanding than a fictive one. Nonetheless, it appears that the structural level with which I am concerned here involves the same conceptual category. The friendship relation differs from the affinal one not in its essential nature, but in the way it is generated and in its tentative, preliminary character. For there is an assumption that over the generations, a non-kin *mwerkindang* relation will turn into an affinal one, as Burridge himself makes clear.

Anthropologists customarily refer to such practices as fictive. Thus, a younger brother among the Tangu becomes a fictive brother-in-law; the wife of a friend becomes a fictive sister. Southwold (1971) has criticized this terminology and suggested that we distinguish between the types of relationship according to whether they are cooperative, reciprocating, and so on, specifying the rights and obligations of each type and the "attributes of tenure"; that is, the rules for recruiting members into each type of relationship. Southwold thus reduces kinship to a set of attributes of tenure, but unrelated persons may enter into the same types of relationships on the basis of attributes other than consanguinity or affinity.

Southwold offers a typology of *philia* relations (or, "congeniacy" relations, to use his term) but this typology is perhaps more illuminating in his own East African than in our Oceanic context. While the English describe the categories of specific *philia* systems in terms of abstract concepts such as "cooperative alliance" or "competitive group exchange," the Tangu designate these same categories by terms such as "brothers" or "siblings of opposite sex" which they explicate in myths and illustrate in ritual behaviour. Burridge (1965) shows in much detail the religio-philosophic ambience of this terminology. Once kin terms have been given meanings on more abstract levels, it then becomes possible to use them in categorizing relationships to which they were not primarily applied.

In carrying on this operation, a society may (but need not) make distinctions between biological and non-biological recruitment criteria to each of the categories. If it does, then it may designate a member recruited by non-biological criteria as fictive, nominal, extended, classificatory, and so on. If a society does not make the distinction, it may still classify the members of a particular category as true, nominal, feeble, but then the criteria for this secondary classification will be based on a quite different and non-genealogical principle to be empirically established by the investigator.

An interesting case of such an investigation is Glasse's work on a category of fictive kin among the South Fore. He reports (1969:30–34) that their behaviour closely resembles that of genealogical kin. Everyone in South Fore

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has a number of such *kasiga*, as they are called, and they are "just as important to the people as those founded on genealogical connection."[4]

South Fore distinguish between "true" and "tenuous" relationships, but this distinction refers to the importance and the solidarity of the bond and not necessarily to its genealogical basis. A man may refer to his *kasiga anagu* (that is, his *kasiga* mother's brother) as a "true" *anagu* while a less dependable, less helpful, but genealogically related mother's brother may be called a "small" *anagu*. Glasse's data indicate that the South Fore *philia* system contains a category of senior persons described by informants as "the person to whom I give and who reciprocates." Religio-philosophic notions about the mother's brother and ritual acts involving him provide a model for this category of persons but this does not necessarily confer special status on persons who happen to be ego's male cross-cousin in the ascending generation.

At the periphery of the *philia* universe, we find persons who are primarily viewed as trading partners and political allies. In societies which have institutionalized hereditary friendship, often there are also non-hereditary forms of friendship in which no assumption of long duration is made, but it is always possible to convert such a friendship into an hereditary relationship if this becomes appropriate.

Societies such as those in the Mount Hagen district where hereditary friendship has not been reported so far, have the kinship, friendship, and *philia* structures which I have identified in this essay. However, the only friendship category about which we have much information is the trading and political partnership analysed by Strathern (1971). It is never formally hereditary, but "if the son is fairly experienced by the time his father dies, he may be able to take up some of the more important exchange relationships in which his father was involved and thus effectively 'step into his father's shoes' " (*ibid.*: 208–13). *Strathern reports that moka* payments are not made to a man who is near death, but to his son instead. This is effectively a transfer of the partnership.

The friendship idiom is used not only between unrelated partners, but also between distant kin who decide not to acknowledge the kin bonds existing between them (*ibid.*:144). Strathern does not say why they ignore these bonds, but he does show that serious disputes are more common between unrelated than between related partners (*ibid.*: 169–70). It appears that kinship recognition among these tribes varies along two axes relative to kinship distance and to the usefulness and pleasantness of the exchange relationship. In these circumstances, the boundaries of kin recognition probably approximate the boundaries of the *philia* universe as we defined it. They are shifting, unstable boundaries which persons are continually crossing.

4 The meaning of *kasiga* which is "when the sun is directly overhead," "when people gather to prepare communal meals" clearly implies involvement in public social exchanges and commensality.

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Rich data on the symbolism defining the *philia* relationship in religio-philosophic terms are available in Strathern (1971). I have already expounded elsewhere (Schwimmer, 1972) that the theme of *philia* (its establishment, disruption, and restoration) is a central issue in New Guinean thought and that it enters into many levels of culture: geographical, zoological, social, magical, religious, and aesthetic.

THE OROKAIVA CASE

Up to this point, I have given some empirical illustrations of simple analytical distinctions. Thus, we can no longer take for granted that the *philia* universe always consists of friends and kin for it may define all friends as kin (as in the Maori) or vice versa (as in the Telefolmin). On the other hand, there are societies where the distinction friend/kin is of subordinate importance because the *philia* universe is classified by different criteria such as cooperative/competitive (Tangu) or real/feeble (South Fore). Then again, there are societies where consanguinity is a distinctive criterion within the *philia* system, but only in combination with other factors (Melpa).

If the Orokaiva case, of which a description now follows, seems more complex than the preceding ones, this may be attributed, at least to some extent, to my method of presentation. While most Oceanic sources are too brief on the subject of friendship to enable us to go beyond summary statements,[5] the Orokaiva facts resemble those reported by Burridge (1957a; 1969) in many respects. But in some respects, the Orokaiva system seems more explicit. It differs from Tangu in having a slightly stronger patrilineal emphasis, less emphasis on collateral relations, and a stronger avoidance of affines. The Orokaiva marriage system, reported elsewhere (Schwimmer, 1970a), seems more highly structured. These factors are probably related to higher population density, larger social networks, higher soil fertility, and more pervasive warfare.

The Orokaiva (population 25,000) live on the fertile volcanic loam of the Mount Lamington foothills. Their main crop of taro once supported villages of six to twelve families, although now, the villages are often larger mainly because of pressure from the Australian administration. Williams (1928, 1930)[6] characterized the society as patrilineal with a strong bilateral emphasis. Women hold a relatively high position which is maintained

5 Early accounts of New Guinea friendship relations are in Mead (1938) and Williams (1940). Later accounts of a *namei* type of relationship are in Pouwer (1955) and Hogbin (1964) and of the *otavo* type in Heider (1970). Oliver (1955), Schoorl (n.d.). The "resemblance friends" found by Williams among the Elema are not unlike the fictive *simbo* of the Orokaiva.

6 Other useful sources on Orokaiva social organization are Crocombe and Hogbin (1963), Rimoldi (1966), Krinks and Waddell (1968), Schwimmer (1967, 1969, 1970a, 1970b, 1970c, 1972).

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our concern is with the total *philia* universe. Meaningful contacts outside the village tend to be almost wholly with persons of the same generation. I shall therefore discuss the intra-generational terms of reference and address, both in the kin and friendship idioms, and both in the Sangara and Sasembata dialects.

The kinship idiom[7] (discussed in detail in Schwimmer, 1970a) contains four consanguinal and three affinal terms; an oversimplified analysis gives the following meanings (for an explanation of the symbols, see footnote 7):

apa SS Sen G-O //C	*simbo* G-O X C	*dambo* Me SS G-O A
eambo SS Jun G-O // C	*ivu* husband	*hovatu* OS G-O A
du OS G-O // C	*ae* wife	*bi* Fe SS G-O A

Affinal relations, according to explicit Orokaiva norms, are cold, formal, and distant though polite, and restrained by strict taboos. Affinal terminology always carries the connotation of obligation and avoidance, and it is never suitable for easy informal discourse. Indeed, when a person desires to keep up easy, informal relations with an affine (and this occasionally happens), his only resource is to maintain whatever term of address he used before the marriage.

All the consanguine terms, however, are regularly used in addressing unrelated persons with whom hereditary friendship links exist, at least in the Sasembata district. *Apa* and *eambo* are also used between men in the same context as the Maori use the term *hoa*; that is, informally and without any implication of kinship or permanent relationship. The wife of a fictional *apa* or *eambo* is called *du* (sibling of opposite sex), but never by an affinal term. The fictional *simbo* differs from the fictional sibling with regard to reciprocal rights and obligations, as will be shown below.

The following Orokaiva terms are used exclusively in a friendship context: *namei* (Sangara) or *apa/eambo* (Sasembata), designating a male friend of a male speaker in the same generation; *otavo* (Sangara and Sasembata) meaning a partner in trading or dancing, or a journey, or a war expedition – a

7 The following classificatory principles underlie the Orokaiva kinship system:
Consanguine (C): *Ego* traces relationship to *alter* through a chain of linkages based on filiation, or a shared clan name, or common birth in a distant village.
Affine (A): Spouses of consanguines of own and junior generation; co-eval and senior consanguines of those spouses.
Generational Removal: G-O: Same generation as *ego*. G1: One generation removed. G2: Two or more generations removed.
Sex of alter: Me: Male. Fe: Female.
Relative sex of ego and alter: SS: Same Sex. OS: Opposite Sex.
Relative sex in consanguineal linkages: //: Relationship is either wholly agnatic or wholly uterine. X: Relationship is neither wholly agnatic nor wholly uterine. It passes through at least one opposite sex linkage.
Relative age of alter: Sen: Older. Jun: Younger.

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571 But for most everyday purposes, the cooperative alliance is even smaller and does not extend beyond the three-generation family.

571 604 881 Relations with uterines, affines, and more distant agnates (that is, those beyond the lineage, and those who are resident in other villages) follow the pattern of competitive exchange. An example of what this implies would be the role of mother's brother as officiator at initiations. Elsewhere, (Schwimmer, 1970b) I show that ideologically, he is the proper person for the office, but that the father's brother and even the father would do as well. The mother's brother is not obliged to act; he is paid if he acts; furthermore he will act only if prior to an initiation, the neophyte involved has obliged his uncle by rendering him small services and being pleasant to him. Certainly the mo/bro si/so relationship is a warm affectionate one, but it is explicitly free from unconditional obligation. It is, in fact, the first formal relationship into which a person enters, where prestations on both sides are by free choice.

602 572 171 How can we explain that, at least in Sasembata, the Orokaiva classify guest friends with the sibling group (by applying the terms *apa/eambo* to them), whereas the Tangu use an affinal idiom? The answer is that siblingship has different connotations in the two tribes. Burridge (1969) emphasizes, above all, the amity that must govern the relationship between senior and junior siblings among the Tangu. If the junior sibling becomes unduly competitive, it is not held against him, but the relationship is redefined so that he becomes a *mwerkindang* – a competitor instead of a subordinate and protégé. The Orokaiva do not permit such a change in status; the younger brother must obey or sever his relations with his family. Moreover, the *apa/eambo* relationship is not confined to the cooperative alliance but includes distant agnates and all uterines within the exogamous group. A good deal of competition and exchange normally occurs between such kin, although the ideology of the *apa/eambo* relationship is basically that of a corporate group pooling resources for the support and protection of its members.

431 437 572 Secondly, the custom of classifying guest friends with siblings is not general among Orokaiva; the Sangara use the term *namei*. Furthermore, terminology is as much an ideological device as a reflection of reality. Use of *apa/eambo* means that people should behave *as if* they were siblings; that is, make free gifts instead of exchange gifts. These terms may be used when one seeks to extract a presentation from a comparative stranger, in which case they mean little more than an appeal *ad misericordiam*. In an hereditary friendship in which it is unusual to make claims, the terms signify that the gifts made to a visiting friend are not repayable but free. Certainly, it would [576] be considered wrong to press claims on the basis of such gifts. On the other hand, the host is expected (*not* merely permitted) to make a return visit, and [626] if he does not present gifts on that occasion, he will certainly be the subject of gossip and loss of reputation. [558]

In considering the manner in which these gifts are given, Sahlins'

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121 tended to play down such a possibility. While the concept of exploitation is perhaps more directly relevant to Marxist theory than alienation, it has certain drawbacks that are now widely recognized. Where use-values are predominant it is common practice to set up not so much a division of labour (Vernant has rightly argued one cannot call it that) but rather an allocation of tasks to persons or social categories who are thought to have special competence for them. Thus, as the most common example, certain tasks are allocated on the basis of criteria like age and sex. Now, this is not in itself exploitation though obviously it may well lead to exploitation. We therefore need a criterion, other than that of the task allocation itself, to determine whether exploitation in fact occurs.

462 I shall press this point by citing one counter-instance. Among the Orokaiva only women are considered competent to harvest.
562 Men never do it and claim that, if they did, the taro supply would be exhausted too soon. As an exception, they do harvest taro for feasts, and this exception only goes to confirm that they would be far too prodigal to act as daily harvesters. Is this just a story to exploit women? When crops are being marketed, the rule among Orokaiva is that the men carry the coffee and are paid for the coffee, but taro and other subsistence vegetables, when taken to market, are taken by women who also retain the money. Their right to the produce is maintained not only for the daily food supply but also when there is money to be earned. Their right to the product of their labour does not seem to be questioned. Thus, by the criteria we have been using, Orokaiva women are not an alienated labour force and it will be seen that *alienation* is more convenient in an operational sense than the concept of exploitation, which may be too broad.

171 While studies of alienation in Melanesia are rare, it is possible to give some indication of the patterns. M. Panoff, in his study of Maenge suicides (1970), did not question the generally accepted model of Melanesian society as governed by certain strong exchange and 'equivalence' principles. He points out, however, that there may well be a minority of marginal individuals who are somehow too weakly established to be within the range of those principles: they may at times press their rightful claims, but without success. Panoff shows that the male suicides among the Maenge occur as a general rule against this background of ruthless and unlimited exploitation. In fact it is only suicide that sets a limit to exploitation in such cases. The proportion of people Panoff places in that category appears to be of the order

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of 5% of male population.[24]

These people were alienated by the criterion we chose because they had been working for someone who refused them what they considered their proper reward – in other words, the right to the product of their labour. At the same time, we note that the phenomenon described by Panoff was marginal: the other 95% of the male population were not alienated.

It is my impression that there are still other alienated categories in Melanesia, especially among defeated groups or clans who lost their land after a war and are reduced to the status of wanderers or, again, who remained on their land but were constantly at the mercy of marauders. When I discussed such cases, I was told by several informants from different villages independently that there were certain weak groups with whom in olden times they practised no exchanges but had only relations of warfare. Such groups evidently possessed some valued resources – not only women but also feathers and other forest products, for instance, but they lay outside the circle where moral principles applied (cf. Williams 1930).[25]

The theoretical importance of such cases may be far greater than their statistical importance. These are, after all, the cases projected by Hobbes in his model of the stateless society. Anthropologists have been much concerned to prove Hobbes wrong, but this concern should not blind us to that minority of situations where he may well have been right. There is not, to my knowledge, any Melanesian ideology which validates and elaborates the Hobbesian model, nor the Nietzschian model[26] that gives full weight to the principle of reciprocity while condemning it as a weakness to be transcended. But is even a Melanesian Nietzsche completely inconceivable?

Identification in the Creation of Exchange Values

Our discussion of the culture hero Jesus Christ was necessarily incomplete. For he did not institute merely payment for labour – a real gift to man but, as we have seen, somewhat limited in scope, but he also gave to the white man all his immeasurable wealth and power. But this wealth and power did precisely not, in the New Guineans' estimation, come to the European by his own wage labour. It came by methods New Guineans did not at once understand. This whole cargo ideology is too well documented to need restatement here, but any study of Melanesian work would be quite incomplete unless it included the category of cargo work, i.e. work to obtain cargo.

27: Schwimmer E-5 (1966-1970) 1979 OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23

appears to be the standard response to lack of time, rather than foregoing coffee.

22. On New Guinea concepts of paid labour and the yield of such labour I learned a great deal from Cloutier (1975–1978).

23. Auge's material on the rich who were inevitably suspected of being zombie masters (1975) is a good illustration of our theme. But on this same phenomenon, see also Ardener (1970).

24. For a somewhat similar analysis of suicide, this time in Polynesia, see Firth (1967, Ch. 5) on suicide and risk taking in Tikopia.

25. For a further example of 'exploitation' of the defeated see Meggitt (1977: 25–26).

26. In *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, Nietzsche (1954: 761–900) offers a detailed discussion of the principle of reciprocity, concerning which he held views rather radically opposed to those of Marcel Mauss. He regarded it as a delusion to be eradicated. Orokaiva likewise regard it as a delusion if practised outside the 'security circle' (see Schwimmer 1979a).

27. This argument, and indeed this entire essay, is close in orientation to Dumont (1977) which can be read as an attempt to set limits on economism in anthropology and elsewhere. We do not question the importance of economics but the delimitation of economics as a separate domain.

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